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An Economic Life in Vain 
– Path Dependence and East Germany’s  
Pre  and Post Unification Economic Stagnation – 
Abstract 
20 years after unification, the East German twin’s economic position is relatively stag-
nant compared to most of the West German productivity and income variables. The 
strong initial takeoff until the mid-end 1990s ended at a level of 70% to 80% of the 
western reference. In this paper, two interdependent hypotheses are put to the test: (i) 
that the communist economy prior to unification was on a stagnating path contrary to 
what standard analyses show; (ii) that strong elements of path dependence exist and that 
the switch from plan to market offset the pre-unification stagnation but was not able to 
repair structural deficits inherited  from the past.  In  fact, looking into  West German 
long-term data, an extremely stable development path can be found that extends from 
the 19
th century to the present. Thus, the analysis of the East German development path 
is both economically relevant and politically interesting if economic policies are to be 
formulated. 
A series of East German output is recalculated to describe the macro-economic devel-
opment relative to the West German twin. In doing so, assumptions are made on the ini-
tial starting point after World War II, the effects of the deterioration of product quality 
over time, the loss of international competitiveness and the unavailability of foreign 
goods on purchasing power. In fact, performance was very bleak, and growth came to 
an end in the 1970s of the last century. This coincides with fundamental changes in the 
world economy, the confiscation of the remaining parts of the private sector and an ever 
expanding subsidization of private consumption. This leads, in sharp contrast to find-
ings by other authors, to a decline of real output until the mid 1980s, when fresh money 
was brought in from the West. At the end, East Germany collapsed on an economic lev-
el comparable to that of West Germany in the mid 1950s to early 1960s, depending on 
whether the external value of goods or internal purchasing powers are taken as a refer-
ence. In spite of overcoming the low starting point into the market economy during the 
first years, East Germany has swung back to its old development path extending from 
the 1950s and the 1960s. In fact, East Germany’s economic effort did not reach beyond 
levels attained in the pre-war industrial district of central Germany – it was an economic 
life in vain. 
Keywords: East Germany, time series, income,  institution, product, unification, eco-
nomic growth, convergence 
JEL Classification: N0, O1, P2  
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Ökonomisch umsonst gelebt 
– Pfadabhängigkeit und Ostdeutschlands ökonomische 
Stagnation vor und nach der Einheit – 
Zusammenfassung  
20 Jahre nach dem Vollzug der Einheit stagniert die Wirtschaftsentwicklung des „ost-
deutschen Zwillings“ im Vergleich zu westdeutschen Einkommens- und Produktions-
kennzahlen. Der starke Wachstumsschub bis in die Mitte der 1990er Jahre ebbte ab, und 
die Wirtschaft verharrt seitdem auf einem Niveau, das 70% bis 80% der westdeutschen 
Referenzgrößen entspricht. In diesem Beitrag werden zwei voneinander unabhängige 
Hypothesen überprüft: (i), dass bereits die kommunistische Wirtschaft Ostdeutschlands 
vor der Einheit auf einem Stagnationspfad war, ganz im Gegensatz zu dem, was andere 
Untersuchungen  ausweisen;  (ii),  dass  eine  starke  Pfadabhängigkeit  existiert  und  der 
Umstieg von der  Zentralverwaltungs- zur Marktwirtschaft nur diese vorangegangene 
Stagnationsphase  kompensierte,  die  tiefer  liegenden  strukturellen  Defizite  aber  nicht 
löste. Im Falle Westdeutschlands reicht ein stabiler Entwicklungspfad vom 19. Jahrhun-
dert  in  die  Gegenwart.  Daher  ist  die  Analyse  des  ostdeutschen  Entwicklungspfads 
gleichzeitig ökonomisch relevant und wirtschaftspolitisch bedeutsam. 
Die  ostdeutsche  Wirtschaftsleistung  wird  rekonstruiert,  um  die  makroökonomische 
Entwicklung im Vergleich zu Westdeutschland  zu beschreiben.  Annahmen über den 
historischen Startpunkt nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, die für die Kaufkraft bedeutsamen 
Folgen der Verschlechterung der Produktqualität, den Verlust an internationaler Wett-
bewerbsfähigkeit und die fehlende Verfügbarkeit ausländischer Güter werden getroffen. 
Ebenso werden die fundamentalen Verschiebungen der Weltwirtschaft in den 1970er 
Jahren einbezogen, die mit einer Konfiszierungswelle mittelständischer Unternehmen in 
der DDR einhergehen; zeitgleich vollzieht sich ein starker Anstieg der Subventionierung 
der Konsumgüter durch den Staat. Im Gegensatz zu den Ergebnissen anderer Autoren voll-
zieht sich ab Anfang der 1970er Jahre ein Niedergang der wirtschaftlichen Leistung bis 
in die Mitte der 1980er Jahre. Als Ostdeutschland wirtschaftlich zusammenbricht, liegt 
seine  wirtschaftliche  Leistung  auf  einem  Niveau,  das  sich  zwischen  der  Mitte  der 
1950er und dem Beginn der 1960er Jahre Westdeutschlands einordnen lässt. Trotz einer 
zu  Anfang  der  1990er  Jahre  beachtlichen  Aufbauleistung  verläuft  das  gegenwärtige 
Wachstum entlang eines Pfads, der in den 1950er und 1960er Jahren begann. Nie er-
reichte das Land eine Wirtschaftsleistung, die die der mitteldeutschen Industrieregion 
vor dem Krieg übertraf. 
Schlagwörter: Ostdeutschland, Einkommen, Institution, Einheit, Wachstum, Konvergenz 
JEL-Klassifikation: N0, O1, P2  
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1.  The Stagnating Twin: the German Economic Divide∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 
When on November 11
th, 1989, the Iron Curtain melted away and the path to Unifica-
tion was paved within less than a year, everybody foresaw a second “Wirtschaftswund-
er” in the new provinces of Germany, especially its southern parts that had been the in-
dustrial core of Central Germany between the Wars (IMF 1990). Today, 20 years and 
some 1,600 b € of transfers1 to the East later, the idea begins to sink in that West and 
East Germany are on distinctly different growth paths. Even though some areas have 
progressed, average eastern per-capita income and productivity have stagnated at a level 
of about 70% to 80% of the west.2  
What had happened? Had East Germany not qualified for the top ten of world econo-
mies as eighth to tenth largest economy of the world? If East Germany’s economic per-
formance is evaluated, one may only wonder. Table 1 provides evidence that per-capita 
products of the GDR were assessed by most scholars and intelligence units at a level of 
two third or higher of West German performance. Most sources gave the impression 
that a strong economy had developed east of the Iron Curtain. This opinion was upheld 
even 5 years after unification when the first economic problems cast their shadows: The 
1989 productivity gap between the East and the West was set at only 50% (WERNER 
1996).  
Table 1: 
East German Product as Share of West German Product 
Source  Year  pcGNP  Source  Year  pcGNP 
DIW  1980  68%  CIA  1985  102% 
World Bank  1980  53%  CIA  1986  76% 
Maurer  1980  43%  Filip-Köhn/Ludwig  1988  57% 
Summers/Heston  1980  80%  GDR  1988  78% 
DIW  1983  76%  Ehrlich  1989  70% 
Klinkmüller  1984  43%  DIW  1989  53% 
GDR  1984  93%  Merkel/Wahl  1989  33% 
Table accumulated from WEGENER (1995, p.45) 
 
                                                 
∗   The author is indebted to Leonard Dudley, Makram El Shagi, Hubert Gabrisch, Udo Ludwig and 
Friedrich Sell for their important remarks on an earlier version of the paper. I owe special thanks to 
Franz Kronthaler and to Guido Bünstorf for their bright comments when drafting a first conference 
version. Three anonymous referees provided helpful insights that added value. 
1   See Blum, Ragnitz et al. (2009); note that only about 10% of this sum is truly growth oriented; the 
majority reflects general budget responsibilities of government (social security, government salaries, 
etc.). 
2   See Lehmann, Ludwig, Ragnitz (2005) and Blum, Buscher et al. (2009); average individual incomes 
are closer to 80% of the west, productivities closer to 70% because of differences in working hours 
and the half-time jobs.  
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In fact, the seemingly impressive initial growth of the new provinces after Unification 
underpinned this impression and led to a loss of perception of the true low potentials of 
East Germany. As Figure 2 shows, growth stalled after 1997. Ever since, the talking of a 
second “Wirtschaftswunder” has ceased and was replaced by pessimism. Some even ar-
gued that economic output, at the end of the 1990s, had just reached the levels of the 
GDR of 1989, at the eve of its collapse (DIW, IfW, IWH 1999; SMOLNY 2003).  
Figure 1: 
 
Source: Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung der Länder, File R1B1, Destatis. 
In this study, it is argued that the data presented in Table 1 – with the exception of Mer-
kel-Wahl – strongly overstated East Germany’s economic position. It is further argued 
that structural problems East Germany established in the fifties and sixties still extend to 
the present. Economic collapse was the result of ill policies that wanted to overcome 
these structural deficiencies through the further centralization of the economy. Howev-
er, this only aggravated the situation and necessitated a first economic bail-out by West 
Germany in the early eighties. The initial take-off after unification resolved the prob-
lems of missing market orientation but not the fundamental structural problems. Unless 
these deficiencies are overcome, there is no reason to believe that East Germany can 
further converge to the West German output level. Clearly, this approach departs from 
the three most important standard explanations of East Germany’s present stagnation: 
•  The overvaluation of the East German Mark in the process of monetary union: 
Because of monetary union and the resulting revaluation effect the capital stock 
devalued  and  unit  labor  costs  exploded.  This  destroyed  competitiveness 
(NÖLLING 1991; SINN, SINN 1992). AKERLOF et al. (1991) assumed that, given 
the export productivity measured by East Germany, less than one fifth of indus-
try could survive a 1:1 exchange rate. 
•  Fundamental limits of absorptive capacity: Transfers given to stabilize private 
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thought  to  adverse  transfer  effects  that  crippled  further  economic  expansion 
(GREINER,  MAASS,  SELL  1994;  BLUM,  SCHARFE,  2002;  BLUM  2009).  As 
GABRISCH, HÖLSCHER (2006, pp 163-164) point out that the problems of the 
transfer economy are aggravated by soft budgets constraints which are known 
from KORNAI (1980) as an important reason for economic slack. 
•  Misguided  public  investment  incentives:  The  encouragement  of  capital-
intensive investments according to a third line of argument runs against the 
“golden rule of accumulation” (PHELPS 1961) and increases, (i), production in-
efficiencies on the level of the East German economy and, (ii), unemployment 
levels that burden public budgets. 
•  Forced anti-inflationary policies by the Bundesbank: According to forth line of 
arguments, economic convergence between the East and the West was halted as 
the  Bundesbank  had  increased  interest  rates  to  limit  inflationary  tendencies 
which developed because of the deficit spending of the Federal Government to 
finance Unification. When Germany introduced the Euro with an exchange rate 
that had risen against its European partners, the loss of international competi-
tiveness hurt the adaptation process of the East (BLUM, LUDWIG 2005). 
 
This approach acknowledges these explanations. It accepts that the initial start was also 
impressive because of changes in the accounting standards from the material product 
system (MPS) to the system of national accounts (SNA). However, East Germany to the 
present has not overcome deficiencies institutionalized by the communist system in the 
fifties and sixties as described by BLUM and DUDLEY (1999, 2000): the symptoms were 
a less productive human capital, a less dynamic innovation milieu3 and missing head-
quarter facilities4 that made West Germany profit which attracted these resources until 
the Wall shut off the East – and again after Unification. Even today, migrants boost 
their  income  because  they  can  engage  in  more  productive  networks  (UHLIG  2006). 
Gender-specific preferences for migration may undermine the long-term basis of the 
East German economy (SCHNEIDER, KUBIS 2010). HALL and LUDWIG (2009) argue in 
the context of a cumulative causation system that backwash and spread effects make the 
West benefit at the expense of the East.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the second chapter gives a brief 
analysis of the reported growth performances of West and East Germany after the war. 
                                                 
3   Many cars in East and West Germany were rather similar, as they shared common ancestors – just 
like consumer electrics, electronics or other industrial products. Some industries were even able to 
preserve this, i.e. Zeiss in Jena, the original location, compared to Zeiss in Oberkochen, Baden-
Württemberg, were many managers and researchers fled to. 
4   All large German public companies (DAX-30) have their headquarters outside East Germany. Only 
one DAX-100 company has its company seat in the East (Berlin). Before the war, well-known global 
players dominated the then Central German Business District like Siemens, Deutsche Bank, Allianz, 
Audi (Auto Union), Zeiss, just to name some famous names.  
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Based on official statistics it is impossible to explain East Germany’s economic failure 
and the resulting economic problems of Unification. The third and fourth chapters are 
devoted to the methodology and the results estimation of a quality-corrected, market-
related GDP-series for East Germany. By extending the series with officially reported 
data after 1990 to the present, the hypothesis of long-term path dependence of East 
Germany’s economic development is tested. 
2.  Economic Development in West and East Germany 
There exist no official data on the economic differences in starting points of the two 
German twins measured in GDP when they separated formally with the foundation of 
the German Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic in 1949. Monetary 
reform in the West (DM, Deutsche Mark) followed by monetary reform in the East, 
both in 1948, had cemented a division that had been politically decided before. 5 For the 
smaller East German twin, deliberate autarky policies aggravated the situation of cuts in 
the division of labor with West Germany and the lost territories of Silesia, Pommerania 
and East Prussia. The economic catastrophe was especially felt in the hard winter of 
1947 (JUDT, 2005, 46-47). Thus, strong evidence suggests that the starting point of East 
Germany was much lower than that of West Germany. 
•  The specific economic divide was hardest felt in the Berlin area already in the 
years before, as parts of the population worked in western zones and lived in the 
east and vice versa. In 1948, the first exchange rate of about 1:3 deteriorated to 
between 1:4 and 1:5 until 1949 when it stabilized again. Income differentials in 
terms of purchasing power run at about 1:4 to 1:5. The 1950 exchange rate in 
Berlin of about 1:3 in Berlin6 gives a hint on the relative performance differ-
ences which, of course, are harder felt in urban than in rural areas, as most of 
production was in non-tradable or non-traded goods. However, the East German 
government, until unification, maintained the fiction of a 1:1 exchange rate.7  
•  SLEIFER  (2006)  provides  data  on  the  economic  costs  of  the  war  within  the 
boundaries of the two parts of Germany, which were later separated. Table 2 
documents that the loss of capital was extremely high in the East that was, be-
fore the war, marginally better developed: after the wall, the shortfall was some 
30% to 40%. Table 3 reinforces this as war damage in the East is 68% higher 
                                                 
5   East Germany’ currency  had different names over time:  DM as “Deutsche Mark der Deutschen 
Notenbank” between 1948 and 1964, MDN as “Mark der Deutschen Notenbank” between 1964 and 
1967, and M, “Mark” until 1990. 
6   Landeszentralbank Berlin Brandenburg (1998, p. 72 and p. 89) gives a precise account on the mone-
tary split in Berlin that developed when, in the Western zones, the DM monetary system was intro-
duced, which led to problems in Berlin where the western and eastern zones intensively met, for in-
stance because of western employees working in the east and vice versa.  
7   Visitors from West Germany were forced to exchange at 1:1 („Zwangsumtausch“).  
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than in the West because the loss in production capacity was also due to repara-
tions and dismantling of industries by the Soviets. 
Table 2: 
Industrial Capital Stock, Germany 
  1936  1944  1948  1950 
West Germany  100  136  113  122 
East Germany  100  138  69  72 
Source: Sleifer, 2006, p. 72, Reichsmark prices of 1936. 
   
Table 3: 
 Per Capita War Damage in Germany until 1953 
  West  East 
War Damage  839  686 
Dismantling of Industries  60  384 
Reparations  23  1,065 
Occupation Cost  689  649 
Total  1,611  2,784 
Source:  Sleifer, 2006, p. 73, Reichsmark prices of 1944. 
Figure 2: 
 
Source:  Own calculations with data from Statistical Office of Germany (1991).  
From official West German national accounts of economic output, measured by GDP, 
an average annual growth rate between 1950 and 1989 of 3.5 % (see Figure 2) is calcu-
lated. The East German per-capita income series, measured in “National Income Pro-
duced8”, implies an annual growth rate of 5.5 % – roughly 2 percentage points higher 
(see Figure 3). This implies that any adverse starting point after the war should have 
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been offset by the growth dynamics of the eastern twin – and Unification should never 
have been an economic problem.9 Different explanations can be offered: 
•  The accounting system:10 All material products of a period produced in produc-
tive sectors of the economy, evaluated at administered process, are included in 
the “Global Product”11 (GP) which thus comes close to a gross value added 
concept. If depreciations and deliveries are subtracted, the “National Income 
Produced” (NIP) is derived which comes close to the net domestic product.  
•  The missing of sectors with potentially reduced dynamics: As the MPS system 
excludes certain service sectors as unproductive and as these sectors, not being 
on the focus of planners as driving the system, thus were not expanding as fast 
as in market economies, this could reduce total dynamics. However, comparing 
employment development in the total economy and in industry would not sup-
port this, as Table 4 shows: Total employment rose faster than employment in 
industry – and nonproductive sector comprised some 0.9 m employees in 1949 
and doubled until 1988 – then about 20% of total employment. 
Figure 3: 
 
Source:  Own calculations with data from Statistical Yearbook of East Germany 1989 (1990). 
Table 4: 
Development of Employment, East Germany 1949   1988 
Sector  Total  Industry  Comm.  Retail  Agric.  Crafts  Nonprod. 
Growth %  0.0039  0.0093  0.0076  0.0029  -0.0220  -0.0233  0.0164 
Source:  Own calculations with data from Statistical Yearbook of East Germany, 1989. 
                                                 
9   If East Germany had had a level of 44% of the West, it would have, given these growth differentials, 
pulled even by 1989. 
10   For a description of the MPS accounting standard see United  ations (1971). 
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From a market perspective, it is obviously known that MPS data lacks credibility as 
markets  that  may  properly  value  goods  are  missing.  However,  Figure  3  seemingly 
shows a systematic problem of strongly overestimating economic performance. An ex-
change rate of 1:3 between the twins in 1950 directly translates into economic perfor-
mance differentials; then East Germany would have been at 73% of the Western level 
by 1989. This value is close to the estimations given by some of the sources in Table 1. 
It would further have implied that East German output collapsed by roughly 50% during 
the transition months. However, this contradicts facts like the exchange rates between 
the East and the West German Mark of 1989 that was about 1:3, the first measurement 
of East German output in 1991, under market conditions, that put it at about one third of 
the West German level, and the international output performance of East Germany: In 
fact “direction coefficient” (Richtungskoeffizient, RiKo), an East-German shadow ex-
change rate measuring the amount of East German marks necessary to Earn a West 
German DM on capitalist markets, had passed the value of four and, thus, had more than 
doubled since 1968 (SCHALK-GOLODKOWSKI, KÖNIG 1988). This implies not only a loss 
of competitiveness but an increasing loss of access to desired imports by consumers for 
reasons of lack of foreign cash.  Following DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK (1999), exports 
and imports accounted for about 25% - 30% of total output12.  
Figure 4: 
 
Source:  Schalk-Golodkowski, König 1988; Schürer et al 1989. 
Seemingly, there is a contradiction between the economic starting point of East Germa-
ny and its final point that has to be resolved if the long-term path of East German eco-
nomic development is to be outlined. The computation of an output measure related to 
market values in a rather closed economy is futile if exchange rates are used. Purchasing 
power parities only are an unsatisfactory solution. Of course, they are able to make 
standards of living comparable, especially in the case of East Germany, where wages 
                                                 
12   Exports and imports were overvalued in East Germany’s price system. The percentage span calcu-
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were low and many goods for primary needs were highly subsidized.13 In case of transi-
tion, this implies that through the introduction of market prices the mix between local 
and tradable goods changes: Formerly international goods may be even hard to trade lo-
cally and many until then local goods come under pressure from imports because of new 
logistics  technologies.  In  fact,  especially  the  highly  subsidized  sectors  showed  the 
strongest  inflationary  dynamics  (NIERHAUS  2001,  Figure  2).  The  true  value  of  East 
German performance should was somewhere between the internal purchasing power – 
up to two thirds of the western twin if quality is not accounted for – and below 25%, as 
set by the direction coefficient.14 
3.  Recalculating East German Output: Methodology 
3.1  Data Availability for German Economic Development 
Long-term  data  for  the  development  of  national  economics  were  published  by 
MADDISON  (1995)  in  -values  of  1990.  In  provides  per-capita  products  of  Germany 
(German  Reich  until  end  of  WW-II;  afterwards  West  Germany)  between  1820  and 
1994. In the MADDISON study, the GEARY-KHAMIS approach was used to ensure the 
transitivity of currency exchange values. Here, this property is not required. This series 
was updated to the year 2003 (MADDISON 2007), and now it includes United Germany 
after WW-II.  
These data cover the period 1900 to 1990 of this study and were extended the series by 
using official GDP statistics for West Germany for the years 1991 to 2010. The latter 
are given in prices of 1990 and had to be rebased to 1995 and translated the data into 
Euros to adapt them to the present monetary system. 15  
Calculating comparable GDP values for East Germany is much more complex as a me-
thod must be found to convert socialist/communist accounting from the material product 
system (MPS) to the system of national accounts (SNA) of market systems. Different 
approaches were used by researchers, for instance 
                                                 
13   The personal income value of these subsidies amounted to 64 % of wages paid to workers in 1988; 
see Haustein (1990, p. 209). This effect of a “second wage bag” (zweite Lohntüte) brought public 
finances under stress and lead to an expansion of consumption without any sound basis in the pro-
duction sphere; see Schwarzer (1999, pp. 175 – 183). 
14   It may be argued that the hardships incurred to leave the system – from imprisonment to being shot – 
are sign of very high opportunity costs of living in the East German system. After the Berlin Wall 
was built, more than 30,000 political prisoners were bought free by the West German government 
for prices averaging 20,000 Euro at the beginning and 100,000 Euro shortly before nification. 
15   If we compare for the period of 1950 to 1989 the correlation between the Maddison series ($ of 
1990) and the official series from Bundesbank (€ of 1995), the correlation is r = 0,99. The factor ap-
plied for recalculating the 1990-based to 1995 was 1.257.  
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•  the revaluation of MPS or SNA quantities with market values: This, however, 
ignores all what is known about price-quantity (-quality) interdependencies and 
leads to an overvaluation of highly subsidized local goods in markets in contrast 
to internationally tradable goods,  especially with high technological content, 
which were underrepresented in the consumer basket because they were ex-
tremely costly or non-existent in communist countries. Such an approach with 
sets  of  deflators  was  used  by  RITSCHL  and  SPOERER  (1997)  or  LUDWIG, 
STAHMER and STÄGLIN (1996).  
•  the correction of aggregates of output with the international value of goods: As 
mentioned above, East Germany calculated for its products traded to the west 
how many East German Marks were necessary to earn one West German Mark, 
the so-called direction coefficient. This value was 1.86 in 1979 and rose to 4.6 
in 1989. The latter value implies that East Germany had about one fifth of the 
external  productivity  of  the  West  (SCHALCK-GOLODKOWSKI,  KÖNIG  1988; 
SCHÜRER et al., 1989). As the productivity of local goods – irrespective of their 
quality – was somewhat higher, an overall level of productivity of one third of 
the west (FILIP-KÖHN, LUDWIG 1990) can be assumed as upper limit. 
•  the quality correction of products: This assumes that a strong decay in quality 
can be identified and, thus, output value is exaggerated; in the nineties, this 
phenomenon was addressed by the US Senate with a view on the adaptation of 
pensions to inflation (BOSKIN et al. 1998). 
 
Given the enormous span of output estimations, a disaggregate approach that recompiles 
the goods consumed or the goods produced and, thus, the existing industry structure 
based on market prices, seems inappropriate. This paper takes up the idea of a quality 
correction of aggregate output. It starts with East German MPS data on net output, adds 
depreciations and compensates for non-accounted “unproductive” sectors to obtain a 
first raw GDP proxy. In a second step, a quality correction is applied by using a metho-
dology applied before by BLUM and DUDLEY (1999). In doing so, it acknowledges the 
impossibility of properly establishing, in terms of microeconomic equilibrium theory, 
an internally consistent market output by re-evaluating output based on goods or sec-
tors. HESKE (2005) has recently published series that include a quality correction which 
will be inquired into at the end of this study. 
3.2  Calculation of an MPS Based GDP for East Germany 
Production data of East Germany is based on the material product system (MPS)16. It 
covers what are assumed to be the “productive” areas of the economy and, thus, exclude 
many service and public activities. This can best be shown with East German employ-
                                                 
16   The Statistical Yearbooks of the GDR contain a thorough description of the methodology of calcu-
lating national income data.  
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ment data which distinguishes between the sectors monitored by national accounting 
(“productive sectors”)17 and those excluded (“non-productive sectors”). Most of the ex-
pansion  of  the  East  German  labor  force  took  place  in  non-productive  sectors  (see  
Table 4).18 Figure 5 shows the development of population and employment according 
to these categories. 
Data of the productive sectors depart from a Global Product from which depreciations 
and deliveries from other sectors  are subtracted to obtain the National  Income Pro-
duced.19 By adding depreciations in productive sectors, a “Gross Income Produced” is 
obtained. If productivities (better: salaries) are assumed to be about the same across all 
sectors (including non-productive sectors20), the data series only based on productive 
output employment can be expanded to a “Gross Domestic Material Product” (GDMP). 
Figure 5: 
 
Source:  Own calculations with data from Stat. Yearbook of East Germany 1989 (1990). 
The Statistical office of Germany (STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT 2000, p. 89) had recal-
culated East German MPS data into SNA BIP data (in East German Marks, nominal 
prices). They calculate a per-capita income of 16,555 M for 1985 – the year of price ba-
sis of official East German Statistics. The value calculated here for 1985 is 17.706 M, 
some 6% higher. 
                                                 
17   These include manufacturing, mining and handicrafts, agriculture and forestry, construction, retail, 
transportation and communication services. 
18   The data excludes some 0.4 m apprentices. 
19   The Statistical Yearbook of the GDR for the Year 1989 gives a good overview on these national ag-
gregates on page 100; for terminology, see United  ations, 1971, p. 98. 
20   See Statistical Yearbook of the German Democratic Republic 1989 (1990), p. 129 shows that the 
variation of salaries across sectors is minimal: In 1988, average monthly salaries were 1,280 M; 
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The starting point of the series in 1950 is of crucial importance for the calculation of the 
economic development path. As prices in the late forties and early fifties were less dis-
torted than from the seventies onwards, a comparison between West and East in terms 
of living standards or exchange rates gives a good sign whether the results calculated 
make  economic  sense.21  Following  the  methodology  described  above,  the  different 
steps are shown in first eight lines of Table 5 for the starting and the final points, 1950 
and 1988. The resulting 1950 East German per-capita GDP in East German Mark was 
2,205 M. As a validation, the 1950 exchange rate of 1:3 is applied to the West German 
1950 per-capita GDP. The resulting East German DM value would be 2,691 DM in 
1950.  In  fact,  the  GDR-Mark  value  is  somewhat below  the  1:3  exchange  rate.  The 
closeness of the two values is evidence of the initial political will of the East German 
government to maintain – even under conditions of different economic performance – 
the fiction of price level parity.22   
The lagged economic starting point of East Germany in 1950, more than two thirds be-
low the West German level which was able to match its pre-war economic level by 
1953, has been observed by East German economists. They especially stress the loss of 
skilled workers as a cause for economic problems (BARTHEL 1979, p. 51). The advan-
tage of an initially more modern and less destroyed stock of capital (JUDT 2005, p. 85-
86) could not be exploited. The inability to access the Marshall funds from 1948 on-
wards prevented a modernization program from which the West German twin profit-
ed.23 To the contrary: In the East the respective firms were relentlessly dismantled and 
shipped to the Soviet Union as part of reparations (see Tables 2 and 3).24 Even under 
normal  conditions  the  data  of  SLEIFER  (2006)  suggests  that  East  Germany’s  output 
                                                 
21   After Honecker took power in 1971, systematic subsidizations of basic goods were introduced to 
pretend a stable price level. The stability of prices became a strategy of social policy. For basic 
needs, price caps were set at 1944 price levels (which were in fact 1936 price levels). Subsidies in-
creased from 8.5 million East German Mark in 1970 to 50 million East German Mark until 1988. 
This was about 10% of the public budget in 1971 and 18% in 1988. See Statistical Yearbook of the 
GDR 1989, p. 276. 
22   Following the purchasing power parity argument of trade theory, exchange rates reflect purchasing 
powers. Assume that the value of a standard good is separated into a price (P) and a term that re-
flects quality (Q) or general availability of goods. Then the exchange rate (w) between East Germany 









w . Assuming equal prices, quality in East Germany would be one third as would 
be the true market value of aggregate market-valued output. 
23   Between 1948 and 1952, West Germany obtained about 1,4 b US-$ in aid, about 20% of the total 
sum. At that time, this was worth about 6 b DM.  
24   Baar et al. (1995, p. 965) set the lag at only 16%. Both private consumption and investments lag 
against the west by 37% and 36% – it is public consumption that is 170% of the West German level 
that pulls the total (and it increases until 1955 to 225%). Public consumption is mainly salaries and is 
included in national products at costs. According to the same source (p. 962) 12,5% of output were 
captured by the Soviet Union. We may add “forced depreciations” because of dismantling of capital 
stock shipped to the Soviet Union which additionally lowers output measured in PNI or in GDP.  
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should have been at 50% of the West at a maximum. The starting point chosen here is 
some 20 percentage points below that of other studies.25 
Table 5: 
 ational Accounting Positions of East Germany, 1950 and 1988 
Income Aggregate (all values in millions)  1950  1988 
prices of 1985 
1. National Income Produced (NIP), in GDR-Mark  30,352  268,060 
2. Depreciations, in GDR-Mark  5,642  31,130 
3. Gross Income Produced (GIP), in GDR-Mark  35,994  299,190 
4. Nonproductive sectors*, in GDR-Mark  4,496  64,127 
5. Gross Dom. Mat. Product (GDMP), in GDR-Mark  40,490  363,317 
6. Per-capita GDMP, in GDR-Mark  2,205  21,788 
7. Per-Capita GDP assuming exchange rate 1:3 (DM)  2,691   
* 1950: +12,5%; 1988: +21,4%. 
Source:  Statistical Yearbook of East Germany 1989; (1990) Statistical Yearbook of Germany 1990, own 
calculations. 
4.  Recalculating East German Output: Quality Correction and 
Results 
4.1  The Role of Quality in Output Measurement 
In a previous paper BLUM and DUDLEY (1999) have addressed the problem of quality 
changes in the East German economy versus the West German economy. The metho-
dology is taken up and deepened here in order to calculate a market-oriented measure of 
per-capita GDP.26 As mentioned before, output of East and West Germany was initially 
rather similar because of common technological roots. The more East Germany sec-
luded itself from international competition and lost access to frontier technologies, the 
more the quality of its output should fall. This may lead to a vicious cycle as investment 
goods, produced with an underperforming stock of capital, will lower the performance 
of the economy for the next generation. In fact, to the extent that quality improvements 
and new products did not occur in East Germany as did in the West – and presumably 
were under-reported, traditional growth rate comparisons will provide an overly favora-
ble image of the planned economies. Assuming that a declining marginal capital prod-
uctivity can be used as a sign of falling technology efficiency, a fall of quality of current 
output can be tracked. If East German marginal capital productivities are relate to those 
                                                 
25   See Ritschl, Spoerer (1997) and Sleifer (2006). 
26   In terms of methodology, the data source was partly updated (Statistische Ämter der Länder 2006; 
Arbeitskreis  Volkswirtschaftliche  Gesamtrechnungen  der  Länder  2009),  the  model  structure  was 
checked against other specifications and a sensitivity and confidence analysis was added.  
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of  the West German twin, a development path of quality change – in fact: deterioration 
– can be obtained. Given the fact that even East Germany was forced to acquire a consi-
derable share of inputs from capitalist markets and that even certain goods, especially 
raw materials, were traded in the COMECON at prices related to the capitalist world, 
this cross comparison seems acceptable. Figure 6 gives the results of the series, both 
transformed into an index (1950 = 100) to ease comparability.27 Given the nature of the 
two economic systems, the series from East Germany is much smoother than that of 
West Germany which is ridden by investment and business cycles. 
Figure 6: 
 
Source:  Stat. Yearbook of East Germany 1989 (1990); Stat. Office of the Federal Republic of Germany 
(1991).  
 
4.2  The Econometric Model 
Let Y represent the value of East-German aggregate production at world prices and V 
represent the volume of output measured by official statistics. If the data can be as-
sumed to be free of deliberate manipulation, then any significant discrepancy in the 
growth rates of the two measures must be due to changes in the quality of output, q, or 








  (1) 
The difficulty in applying equation (1) to estimate economic growth in East Germany is 
that q is not directly observable. However, the change in quality of aggregate output in a 
non-market economy vis-à-vis a market economy can be measured, as shown above, by 
the ability of a dynamic system to reproduce itself over time, i.e. by a comparison of the 
                                                 
27   Averages of the original series for West Germany are 0.44 and for East Germany 0.281 (both in 

































IOCR of West and East Germany, 1950 - 1989
IOCR West Germany IOCR East Germany 
IWH   __________________________________________________________________ 
 
IWH Discussion Paper 10/2011 
18
incremental output-capital ratio in the planned economy (e.g. East Germany) to that of a 
“benchmark” market economy (e.g. West Germany), indicated by asterisks:  






q η η = ≡ ,  (2) 
where η is a constant28 and K is the reported capital stock. Then the rate of change in 









− =    (3) 

















  (4) 
The term dV/dK may be considered as a marginal productivity whose credibility de-
pends on the quality of the data and that only can be evaluated under conditions of 
0 ≠ dK . A quadratic trend was fitted to the East and West-German incremental output-
capital ratios from 1951 to 1988; Table 6 gives the results.  
Table 6: 
Quadratic Trend of Index of Incremental Output Capital Ratio, IOCR,  
for East Germany and West Germany (1950 1989) 
  East Germany  West Germany 
constant  0.7297  1.1471 
  (16.80)  (10.55) 
t  -0.0390  -0.0664 
  (8.411)  (6.726) 
t
2  0.00060  0.0012 
  (5.735)  (4.568) 
adjR
2  0.8207  0.5577 
n  40  40 
Source:  Own calculations. 
Fitted values (i.e. estimates of the original series using the above equations) and their ra-
tio are shown in Figure 7. After remaining relatively stable in the 1950s and 1960s, this 
measure of quality fell sharply in the 1970s and 1980s. By 1988, the fitted ratio was 53 
percent of its value in 1950. Applied to the East German data produced the results for 
East Germany given in Figure 8: Until the early 1970s, the observed values calculated 
by the East German Statistical Office and augmented, as described above, in order to be 
                                                 
28   It is only necessary to normalize values to unity at the beginning of the series; see Figure 6 and 7.   
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comparable to the concept of the GNP, are identical to the quality-corrected values. Af-
ter this period, they start to deviate; in fact, a decline from the seventies until the mid 
eighties can be observed. By comparing the development of this quality index to that of 
the direction coefficient in Figure 4, striking similarities become apparent. In fact, both 
indicate a decline of quality to about half of the initial value. 
Figure 7: 
 
Source:  Own calculations. 
The decline in East German output from the 1970s onwards already visible in Figure 8 
is affirmed. In 1972, on short notice, most of the still private enterprises or private en-
terprises  with  government  interest  (30%  to  50%  of  equity)  were  confiscated  when 
HONECKER came to power. The share of workers in socialist industries rose from 85.3% 
in 1970 to 94.6% in 198029.  In many cases, this also drove out the entrepreneurs. Espe-
cially deliveries of consumer goods to West Germany were affected. Following the sta-
tistics of the GDR30, the larger private enterprises with a state interest employed about 
6% of the “productive” workforce, but held 9 % of output31. This implies that they were 
roughly 50% more productive than the average economy, which means 60 % instead of 
40 % of West German productivity. In addition, the globally changing patterns of raw 
material prices known as the “oil crisis” affected East Germany, especially inputs. Not 
only OPEC but also the Soviet Union adjusted process upward. Finally, increasing sub-
sidies were necessary to stabilize prices of basic consumer needs.  The East German 
analyst HAUSTEIN (1990, p. 214)  observed that this diversion of funds from investment 
reduced output growth, led to declining productivity growth, and most importantly, a 
decline in the quality of goods since 1970. The corresponding loss of international com-
petitiveness may have resulted in the current accounts crisis developing in the 1970s 
                                                 
29   Statistical Yearbook of East Germany, 1985, p. 113. 
30   Statistical Yearbook of East Germany, 1980, pp. 73 and 87. 
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and the severe liquidity crisis of 1982: The net debt position against western countries 
had by then risen to 25.1 DM which led to the famous “STRAUß-Kredit” from West 
Germany to bail out East Germany under the condition of dismantling some of the most 
atrocious killing devices at the border32. With the improvement of exports, this value 
decreased to 15.5 m DM until 1985, but then rose again to 19.9 m DM at the eve of un-
ification (DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK 1999, p. 59). The political system was unwilling and 
unable to use this last chance to reform the economic system (STEINER 2004). 
Figure 8: 
 
Source:  Own calculations. 
 
4.3  Robustness of Results 
By adding cubic time trends to replaced or complement the regressors, an improvement 
of results was not possible. The assumption of joint residuals did not improve results. 
As Figures 6 and 7 show the impressive effects of productivity increases in Germany 
from the mid 1970s onwards, the effect of omitting last observations was tested.33 The 
last nine years (until the beginning of the current accounts crisis) and the last 17 years 
(until the expropriations) to account for two effects: the strong upward trend in West 
German productivity at the end of the eighties and the two major events marking stagna-
tion in East Germany. The results in Table 7 show a general robustness of the equation.  
However, the shortening of the sample leads to an increased “curvature” in the sense 
that bot the linear and the quadratic terms increase in absolute values. In fact, we see 
from Figure that the last years of East Germany have broken the upward trend: it is 
stronger in the estimate for the period until 1972 (dotted-broken line) than for the period 
                                                 
32   Note the discussion on this point in the memoirs of Strauß (1989), published after his death, but be-
fore unification and those of his negotiation partner Schalk Golodkowski (2000), on the severity of 
the situation. 
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until 1980 (broken line) – but in both cases above the estimate that reach until 1989. For 
these series the 95% confidence intervals for the results of the East German growth es-
timation based on the West German reference (GDR+ and GDR-) were computed.  
Table 7: 
Quadratic Trend of Index of Incremental Output Capital Ratio, IOCR,  
for East Germany and West Germany – Test of Robustness 








constant  0.9361  0.8205  1.2880  1.1756 
  (18.62)  (17.76)  (9.612)  (9.222) 
t  -0.0826  -0.0559  -0.1006  -0.0736 
  (9.359)  (8.987)  (4.275)  (4.287) 
t
2  0.0022  0.0011  0.0027  0.0015 
  (6.805)  (6.467)  (3.016)  (3.047) 
adjR
2  0.8986  0.8560  0.6629  0.5754 
n  23  31  23  31 
Source: Own calculations. 
Figure 9: 
 
Source:  Own calculations. 
All results are shown in Figure 9. It is clear that dropping observations reduces the ef-
fect of the impressive regaining of productivity in West Germany. Evidently, it is highly 
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ported level. This upper bound is about the level reported by other authors, as will later 
be discussed.  
 
4.4  The Economic Performance of 1989 and the Transition Crisis 
1990 
An important debate on the GDR’s economic performance, and thus its end points of 
economic performance, was led when preparing German Monetary Union (GMU)34. In 
1989/1990, the black market exchange rate in West Berlin was 6.5 East Mark for 1 DM. 
This value would reflect a productivity gap of 85%.  The “official” exchange rate was 
1:3 and seemed, at that time, acceptable as general exchange rate to the GDR govern-
ment. It implied, for production costs, a rate of about 1:5.35 This would imply an aver-
age productivity gap of 75%. This may compared to the per-capita product values of 
1991, the first full year of East Germany with the DM as joint currency. The per-capita 
GDP (1995 prices) in the west was 25,160 € and in the east 8,322 €.  The value com-
puted for 1989 according to the corrections proposed is 8,598 €. Seemingly, these re-
sults suggest that no adaptation crisis can be found in these figures – contrary to what is 
known from transition literature. Two effects must be distinguished and treated sepa-
rately: 
•  If a quality correction is applied, this implies that a strong devaluation of output 
has taken place. Insofar as the least productive plants are closed first and the 
least marketed goods are replaced first, their contribution to value added has – 
at least to a large extent – been discounted. 
•  From statistics and observations it is known that about two thirds of industrial 
workers lost their jobs and were redirected into part-time programs, early re-
tirement,  restructuring  and  training  programs  and  unemployment.  WELFENS 
(1996, p. 519) claims that after Monetary Union on July 1
st, 1990, industrial 
output, which accounted for roughly one third of East German output,36 fell 
about 25% until the end of 1990 and about halved until February 1991. Data 
from AKERLOF et al.(1991, Table 1 and 2) point into a similar direction: ac-
counting for declines in prices of about 50% until the end of 1990, the indus-
try’s contribution to GDP should have fallen by 75%,  Taking the share in the 
economy of about 42.2 % (STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE GDR, 1989, p. 112), 
this effect alone should have reduced total output by some 30%. As other sec-
                                                 
34   For a detailed survey, see  ölling (1991). The above data is taken from pages 22 – 23.  
35   Because of ancillary labor costs that did not exist in the East German taxation system, this leverage 
has to be included. 
36   If we depart from a workforce of about 8.6 m persons (without apprentices) and the number of about 
3.2 m persons working in industry in 1989 halved, then output should fall by 18%. About 0,3 m per-
sons left East Germany until 1991, partly looking for better jobs, partly because of unemployment.  
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tors, especially construction and retail as well as the public sector, remained 
stable in this first transition period and even strongly expanded afterwards, the 
proposition by DIW et al. (1999) that a decline of East German GDP was 35% 
over these two years may be exaggerated.  
•  This calculation however neglects the well known fact of large unemployment 
within the socialist firm theoretically derived by KORNAI (1980) and shown by 
KOWALSKI (1987) in the Polish case to be around 35% in administration and 
20% in production. GÜRTLER, RUPPER and VOGLER-LUDWIG (1990) calculate 
some 15% for the average of East Germany. The above calculation of a decline 
of some 35% after 1989 would imply that, until 1996, no real improvement of 
the living standard in East Germany should have occurred. It would exclude the 
well documented facts about slack that necessitated labor shedding to a large 
extent. It neglects the many stabilizing effects were put in place. Especially so-
cial benefits indirectly contributed to GDP by stabilizing the demand side, es-
pecially for local goods.37 Thus, the average output dip of 1990 should not ex-
ceed 15% if countervailing expansion effects are accounted for such as public 
housing, infrastructure investment etc. This is in line with the growth rates after 
Unification. Applying a growth rate of 20% – the average of the first three years 
after Unification to the period 1990/1991 and comparing the 1989 level to that 
calculated for 1991, a drop of around 10 % is obtained. However, it is very like-
ly that monthly output values in winter 1990/1991 may have been 30% below 
pre-unification output. 
 
Figure 10 visualizes the long-term development: Starting at one third of the West Ger-
man level, East Germany was able to catch up to about 50% of the West German per-
capita-GDP as a small Eastern Wirtschaftswunder had developed until the mid sixties. 
The seventies were a period of relative stagnation, the eighties of decline, the transition 
of a short but marked drop. The economy resumed, after a string initial expansion, the 
initial development path of the fifties and sixties.  
Seemingly the maximum level of per-capita output was close to the 1938 output levels 
of the German Reich. Statistics from the Central German Business District, which be-
came the GDR after the war, show that its southern half (Berlin and southwards) was 




                                                 
37   Household income in 1991 had already reached 54% of the West German (DIW, IfW, IWH, 1999,  
p. 210); 60% are considered necessary to eliminate incentives to migrate to the west as this level 
represents the welfare level of the west.  
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Source:  Own calculations. 
The two initial hypotheses that (i) the communist economy prior to Unification was on a 
stagnating path contrary to what standard analyses show; (ii) that strong elements of 
path dependence exist and that the switch from plan to market offset the pre-unification 
stagnation but was not able to repair structural deficits inherited from the past, become 
very visible in Figures 10 and 12. In fact, accelerated growth in the nineties was nothing 
but a compensation of growth potentials lost in the seventies and the eighties. And the 
convergence to West German performance levels will remain arduous for quite some 
time. In fact, Figure 12 suggests that the annual speed of convergence is some 0.4 per-
centage points. Because of differences in settlement structure and population density, 
the West German average is not the true reference point. If from the West German Lan-
der City-Lander and agglomerations like Munich, Frankfurt or Cologne-Düsseldorf are 
excluded, than a benchmark of some 90 % of West Germany seems economically sound 
and achievable (BLUM, LUDWIG et. al. 2011, p. 57). This would still take more than fifty 
years, a value also computed by LUDWIG and SCHEUFELE (2009).  
5.  Comparison of Results to those from other Studies 
Finally, the series calculated in this study (“GDR_B2011”) are compared to the results 
of other analyses: 
•  the original series of East Germany (“GDR_orig”), which were recalculated in 
order to included non-productive sectors, but based on the Material Product 
System as accounting standard; 
•  The series computed by HESKE (2005) for East Germany (“GDR_Heske”); this 
series is given in prices of 1995 and thus, no revaluation was needed; it only 
covers the years from 1970 to 1989. 
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•  RITSCHL and SPOERER (1997) provide long annual GDP series for East, West 
and the total of Germany (“GDR_RS”) based on prices of 1913; they had to be 
revalued using the 1950 to 1955 official West German GDP data. 
 
The results are shown in Figure 12. By methodology, GDR_orig and GDR_corrected 
have the same starting points in 1950 (and for the preceding years). The ending points in 
1989 of the HESKE and the RITSCHL/SPOERER series are some 4,000 € in per-capita in-
come below the official East German statistic and above those computed here. Given a 
measured per-capita GDP of 8,322 € in 1991, this result implies that transition had lo-
wered output by 35% which is consistent with the value that DIW, IfW and IWH (1999) 
had proposed. And in addition, it implies that East Germany stood on a growth path at 
the end of the 1980s that abruptly came to a standstill with transition – clearly for the 
official  East  German  series  and  the  HESKE  series,  to  a  lesser  degree  for  the 
RITSCHL/SPOERER series.  
These results do not contradict the second hypothesis of a permanently lower growth 
path for East Germany. Only the economic downswing and consecutive stagnation start-
ing in the seventies is replaced by a more dynamic development until 1989, which is in 
full opposition to the stagnation hypothesis. 
Figure 11: 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
This raises the following questions: 
•  How can these results be accommodated with the internal view that East Ger-
many was, as the SCHÜRER-Report in summer 1989 (SCHÜRER et al., 1989) had 
suggested, stagnating or even bankrupt by 1989. And why did it so desperately 
need foreign cash in 1981 if development was so smooth? 
•  As the West German per-capita GDP value of 1989, when the five series end, is 
23.173 €, the official East German series reaches more than two thirds of the 










































Comparison of Estimates of East German Per-Capita GDP, 
1945 - 1989
GDR_orig GDR_corrected GDR_Heske GDR_RS 
IWH   __________________________________________________________________ 
 
IWH Discussion Paper 10/2011 
26
55% of the West German level, it becomes difficult to understand why transi-
tion was so hard (or even necessary). It would have exactly matched the aver-
age exchange rate at currency union of 1:1.7. DIW (1990) computes a slightly 
lower  value  of  about  11,500  Euro  per  inhabitant  in 1989  (1995  prices).  By 
comparing them to West German values in the same study, a ratio of 49% is de-
rived.38 In fact, under these conditions Unification should have been much less 
arduous. And as the drive to unification had a strong economic momentum, as 
East  Germany  already  acknowledged  in  the  SCHÜRER-Report,  it  could  have 
been avoided. 
•  Given a much better starting point and putting most of the blame of growth not 
to fundamental structural problems but to problems of the economic system, 
why East Germany was not able to step on a higher growth path after the initial 
expansion? 
 
Note  that  these  values  are  slightly  below  those  given  by  FILIP-KÖHN  and  LUDWIG 
(1990), which are about 9,000 Euro/inhabitant for 1988 and about 40% of the level of 
the west.39  
Seemingly,  contrafactual  evidence  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  East  Germany’s  true 
economic development is better portrayed by the series proposed in this study and that 
two aspects have to be included if analyze East Germany’s development path is to be 
analyzed: (i), long-term structural problems produced by communism and the fleeing of 
elites and – from an economic perspective – dominant economic units (“headquarter fa-
cilities”) that were not compensated with unification; (ii), on and above these effects a 
reckless centralization and subsidization policy from 1971 onwards that drove the sys-
tem into underinvestment and stagnation but could be offset after unification. 
Finally, the 1985 per-capita GDP value of the STATISTSCHE BUNDESAMT (2000, p. 69; 
p. 89) of 16,665 M is applied to the average conversion rate of 1 : 1.7 at unification, a 
value is obtained (9,707 M of 1985 that is close to the quality-adjusted results calculated 
here  (10,201 M).40  
 
                                                 
38   It was impossible to resolve the question, why the value accumulated by Wegner shows 53% (Table 
1). 
39  Again, it was not feasible to resolve the question, why Wegener gave a value of 57% in his study (Ta-
ble 1). 
40  As mentioned before, internal values of East Germany and external values differed. In 1985, the ex-
ternal exchange rate was 1:2.6 ; see Statistsches Bundesamt (2000, p. 69). The RiKo was already at 
1:2.96 .  
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6.   The Consolidated Picture 
Rarely has it been possible to analyze the economic development of a country from its 
beginning to its end. East Germany is such a case, and the explication of its failure – 
and the ill perception of its true economic performance – can be found in two elements: 
Its starting position in the late forties of last century, which many considered as better 
than it really was, because it lay ground to fundamental structural problems of East 
Germany that have not yet been overcome; the severing conditions from the 1970s  by 
recklessly centralizing the economy and satisfying consumer needs of the population at 
the expense of sustainable growth, which led to a balance of payments crisis in 1981 
and in 1988. In 1989, the political and economic system of East Germany collapsed. Af-
ter a short and dynamic expansion, convergence to West German income levels has 
stalled at around 70%. 
The long-term development path of East Germany has not changed since the late forties 
of last century. The communist system laid ground to a loss of human capital and a less 
efficient innovation system. Its visible sign are the company headquarters that fled and – 
until today – have not come back and could not be compensated by combines unable to 
survive transition.  
The stagnation that started in the seventies and well reached into the eighties of last cen-
tury was compensated within few years after unification by accelerated growth only to 
lead the East, from the end nineties on, in back to its long-term economic trajectory. 
Any policy that wants to break this trend has to confront the stubbornly stable structural 
deficiencies of the East German economic system. 
Quality corrected peak production of the GDR, which was reached in the early 1970s 
has never passed the output of the Central German Industrial District in the late 1930s 
(BAYERISCHES STATISTISCHES LANDESAMT 1936). Although data on regional output is 
not available, this region had above average high energy consumption, tax generation, 
car ownership or telephone availability – characteristics that are highly correlated with 
economic performance. In fact looking at this result, the economic life of the GDR was 
“in vain”.  
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